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1OPoR: Enabling Proof of Retrievability in
Cloud Computing with Resource-Constrained
Devices
Jin Li, Xiao Tan, Xiaofeng Chen, Duncan S. Wong, Fatos Xhafa
Abstract—Cloud Computing moves the application soft-
ware and databases to the centralized large data centers,
where the management of the data and services may not
be fully trustworthy. In this work, we study the problem of
ensuring the integrity of data storage in Cloud Computing.
To reduce the computational cost at user side during the
integrity verification of their data, the notion of public
verifiability has been proposed. However, the challenge is
that the computational burden is too huge for the users
with resource-constrained devices to compute the public
authentication tags of file blocks. To tackle the challenge,
we propose OPoR, a new cloud storage scheme involving
a cloud storage server and a cloud audit server, where
the latter is assumed to be semi-honest. In particular, we
consider the task of allowing the cloud audit server, on
behalf of the cloud users, to pre-process the data before
uploading to the cloud storage server and later verifying the
data integrity. OPoR outsources the heavy computation of
the tag generation to the cloud audit server and eliminates
the involvement of user in the auditing and in the pre-
processing phases. Furthermore, we strengthen the Proof
of Retrievability (PoR) model to support dynamic data
operations, as well as ensure security against reset attacks
launched by the cloud storage server in the upload phase.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing has been envisioned as the next
generation architecture of the IT enterprise due to its
long list of unprecedented advantages: on-demand self-
service, ubiquitous network access, location-independent
resource pooling, rapid resource elasticity, and usage-
based pricing. In particular, the ever cheaper and more
powerful processors, together with the “software as a
service” (SaaS) computing architecture, are transforming
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data centers into pools of computing service on a huge
scale.
Although having appealing advantages as a promising
service platform for the Internet, this new data storage
paradigm in “Cloud” brings many challenging issues
which have profound influence on the usability, reliabil-
ity, scalability, security, and performance of the overall
system. One of the biggest concerns with remote data
storage is that of data integrity verification at untrusted
servers. For instance, the storage service provider may
decide to hide such data loss incidents as the Byzantine
failure from the clients to maintain a reputation. What is
more serious is that for saving money and storage space
the service provider might deliberately discard rarely
accessed data files which belong to an ordinary client.
Considering the large size of the outsourced electronic
data and the client’s constrained resource capability, the
core of the problem can be generalized as how can the
client find an efficient way to perform periodical integrity
verification without the local copy of data files.
In order to overcome this problem, many schemes
have been proposed under different system and security
models [1]–[10]. In all these works, great efforts have
been made to design solutions that meet various re-
quirements: high scheme efficiency, stateless verification,
unbounded use of queries and retrievability of data, etc.
According to the role of the verifier in the model, all
the schemes available fall into two categories: private
verifiability and public verifiability. Although achieving
higher efficiency, schemes with private verifiability im-
pose computational burden on clients. On the other hand,
public verifiability alleviates clients from performing a
lot of computation for ensuring the integrity of data
storage. To be specific, clients are able to delegate a
third party to perform the verification without devotion
of their computation resources. In the cloud, the clients
may crash unexpectedly or cannot afford the overload of
frequent integrity checks. Thus, it seems more rational
and practical to equip the verification protocol with
public verifiability, which is expected to play a more
important role in achieving better efficiency for Cloud
Computing.
2What’s more, there is another major concern among
previous designs, that is the support of dynamic data
operation for cloud data storage applications. In Cloud
Computing, the remotely stored electronic data might
not only be accessed but also be updated by the clients,
e.g., through block modification, deletion, insertion etc.
Unfortunately, the-state-of-the-art in the context of re-
mote data storage mainly focus on static data files and
this dynamic data updates has received limited attention
in the data possession applications so far [1]–[3], [9],
[11]. Though such problem also has been addressed in
[12]–[14], it is well believed that supporting dynamic
data operation can be of vital importance to the practical
application of storage-outsourcing services. In view of
the key role of public verifiability and dynamic data
operation support for cloud data storage, in this paper
we present a framework and an efficient construction
for seamless integration of these two components in
our protocol design. In addition, most of existing works
adopt weaker security models which do not take into
account the reset attack. Specifically, the cloud storage
server can trigger reset attacks in the upload phase to
violate the soundness of the scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, it seems that no
existing scheme can simultaneously provide provable
security in the enhanced security model and enjoy
desirable efficiency, that is, no scheme can resist reset
attacks while supporting efficient public verifiability
and dynamic data operations simultaneously.
Contributions: Our contribution can be summarized as
follows:
 We propose OPoR, a new PoR scheme with two
independent cloud servers. Particularly, one server
is for auditing and the other for storage of data.
The cloud audit server is not required to have high
storage capacity. Different from the previous work
with auditing server and storage server, the user
is relieved from the computation of the tags for
files, which is moved and outsourced to the cloud
audit server. Furthermore, the cloud audit server
also plays the role of auditing for the files remotely
stored in the cloud storage server.
 We develop a strengthened security model by con-
sidering the reset attack against the storage server in
the upload phase of an integrity verification scheme.
It is the first PoR model that takes reset attack into
account for cloud storage system.
 We present an efficient verification scheme for
ensuring remote data integrity in cloud storage.
The proposed scheme is proved secure against reset
attacks in the strengthened security model while
supporting efficient public verifiability and dynamic
data operations simultaneously.
A. Related Work
Recently, much research effort has been devoted
largely to ensure the security of cloud computing [15]–
[18] and remotely stored data [1]–[3], [9], [11], [19]–
[21]. Ateniese et al. [1] defined the “provable data
possession” (PDP) model for ensuring possession of files
on untrusted storages. They also proposed the first proof-
of-storage scheme that supports public verifiability. The
scheme utilizes RSA-based homomorphic tags for au-
diting outsourced data, such that a linear combination
of file blocks can be aggregated into a single block and
verified by employing homomorphic property of RSA.
However, the data owner has to compute a large number
of tags for those data to be outsourced, which usually
involves exponentiation and multiplication operations.
Furthermore, The case of dynamic data storage has not
been considered by Ateniese et al., and the direct exten-
sion of their scheme from static data storage to dynamic
case brings many security problems. In their subsequent
work [11], Ateniese et al. proposed a dynamic version of
the prior PDP scheme. However, the system imposes a
priori bound on the number of queries and do not support
fully dynamic data operations. In [22], Wang et al.
considered dynamic data storage in distributed scenario,
and the proposed challenge-response protocol can both
determine the data correctness and locate possible errors.
Similar to [11], they only considered partial support for
dynamic data operation. In [21], they also considered
how to save storage space by introducing deduplication
in cloud storage. Recently, Zhu et al. [19] introduced the
provable data possession problem in a cooperative cloud
service providers and designed a new remote integrity
checking system.
Juels et al. [2] introduced a “proof of retrievability”
(PoR) model, where spot-checking and error-correcting
codes are adopted to ensure both “possession” and
“retrievability” of data files in archive service systems.
However, public verifiability is not supported in their
scheme and the data owner also has to make many
computational efforts to generate tags for those data to
be outsourced. Shacham et al. [3] designed an improved
PoR scheme with public verifiability based on BLS
signature and the proofs are given in a stronger security
model defined in [2]. Similar to the construction in [1],
they used publicly verifiable homomorphic authentica-
tors that are built from BLS signatures and proven secure
in the random oracle model.
For the first time, Erway et al. [23] explored con-
structions for dynamic provable data possession. They
extended the PDP model in [1], [24] to support provable
updates to stored data files using rank-based authen-
ticated skip lists. This scheme is essentially a fully
dynamic version of the PDP solution. In particular, to
support updates, especially for block insertion, they tried
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Fig. 1: Cloud data storage architecture
to eliminate the index information in the “tag” computa-
tion in Ateniese’s PDP model [1]. However, any update
on the stored file F , even few blocks, will result in the
inevitable updates of rank and interval information of all
nodes along the path from the updated blocks to the top
leftmost node, thus introducing significant computational
complexity and losing desirable efficiency. In general,
all of the above works do not take the reset attack into
account, and impose heavy computation overhead at the
client side. In [25], [26], they proposed a new PoR
scheme which supports dynamics, however, the users
still have to compute all the tags before uploading.
In our solution, we propose an efficient remote data
verification scheme simultaneously supporting public
verifiability and fully dynamic data operations for PoR
systems. As an extension of [27], this paper firstly
formally defines the system model and security model
for the cloud storage. Different from the previous works,
the users are not required to compute the tags for the
outsourced data. Thus, the computational overhead at
the user side is very low. Furthermore, we also present
the detailed security analysis and efficiency analysis
for OPoR in this paper under the new security model.
In particular, our construction can resist reset attacks
triggered by the cloud storage server in the upload
phase, and alleviate clients from performing a lot of
computation for ensuring the integrity of data storage.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Model
A representative network architecture for cloud data
storage is illustrated in Figure 1. Three different network
entities can be identified as follows:
 Client: an entity that has large data files to be
stored in the cloud and relies on the cloud for
data maintenance and computation, can be either
individual consumers or organizations.
 Cloud Storage Server (CSS): an entity, which is
managed by Cloud Service Provider (CSP), has
significant storage space and computation resource
to maintain client’s data. The CSS is required to
provide integrity proof to the clients or cloud audit
server during the integrity checking phase.
 Cloud Audit Server (CAS): a TPA, which has
expertise and capabilities that clients do not have,
is trusted to assess and expose risk of cloud storage
services on behalf of the clients upon request. In this
system, the cloud audit server also generates all the
tags of the files for the users before uploading to
the cloud storage server.
In the cloud paradigm, by putting the large data
files on the remote servers, the clients can be relieved
of the burden of storage and computation. As clients
no longer possess their data locally, it is of critical
importance for the clients to ensure that their data are
being correctly stored and maintained. That is, clients
should be equipped with certain security means so that
they can periodically verify the correctness of the remote
data even without the existence of local copies. In case
that clients do not necessarily have the time, feasibility
or resources to monitor their data, they can delegate the
monitoring task to a trusted cloud audit server of their
respective choices.
In this paper, we only consider verification schemes
with public verifiability: any party in possession of the
public key can act as a verifier. We assume that the cloud
audit server is unbiased, however, the storage server is
untrusted.
B. Security Model
Shacham and Waters proposed a security model for
PoR system in [3]. Generally, the checking scheme is
secure if (i) there exists no efficient algorithm that can
cheat the verifier with non-negligible probability; (ii)
there exists a polynomial-time extractor that can recover
the original data file by carrying out multiple challenges-
responses. Under the definition of a PoR system, the
client periodically challenges the storage server to ensure
the correctness of the cloud data and the original files
can be recovered by interacting with the server. The
definitions of correctness and soundness was given in
[3]: the scheme is correct if the verification algorithm
accepts when interacting with the valid prover (e.g., the
server returns a valid response) and it is sound if any
cheating server that convinces the client that is storing
the data file is actually storing that file.
Note that in the “game” between the adversary and the
client, the adversary has full access to the information
stored in the server, i.e., the adversary plays the role of
the prover (server). In the verification process, the goal
of adversary is to cheat the client, i.e., trying to generate
valid responses and pass the data verification without
being detected.
4Our security model has subtle but crucial difference
from that of the prior works. Though some previous
works also considered the architecture with two servers,
our construction achieves the outsourcing of the tag
generation. Thus, the new scheme also requires to pre-
vent the cloud audit server from generating invalid tags
for the client’s files stored in the cloud storage server.
The authentication from the cloud servers is used in
the new system to achieve this security requirement.
In order to successfully perform the verification while
achieving blockless, the server should take over the job
of computing. Due to this construction, our security
model differs from that of the original PoR in both the
verification and the data updating process. Specifically,
in our scheme tags should be authenticated by the client
(prover) in each protocol execution other than calculated
or pre-stored by the client.
Besides, our PoR model is the first to support dynamic
update operations and security against reset attack in a
verification scheme. The robustness against reset attack
ensures that a malicious storage server can never gain
any advantage of passing the verification of an incor-
rectly stored file by resetting the client (or the audit
server) in the upload phase. We will see that most of
existing PoR schemes can not ensure this strong security
for cloud storage.
C. Design Goals
Our design goals can be summarized as the following:
(1) Public verifiability: to allow anyone, not just the
clients originally stored the file, to have the capability to
verify correctness of the remotely stored data; (2) Low
computation overhead at the client side: to upload data
to the cloud server while supporting verifiability, the data
owner does not have heavy additional computation; (3)
Dynamic data operation support: to allow the clients to
perform block-level operations on the data files while
maintaining the same level of data correctness assurance;
(4) Stateless verification: to eliminate the need for state
information maintenance at the verifier side between
audits and throughout the long term of data storage.
This is also the basic requirement for achieving public
verifiability. In particular, we aim to achieve enhanced
security against reset attacks in our construction.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF POR SCHEMES WITH PUBLIC
VERIFIABILITY AND DYNAMIC DATA OPERATION
SUPPORT
We start with some notations and definitions of our
scheme, followed by the construction details and discus-
sion of dynamic data operation support.
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Fig. 2: Merkle hash tree authentication of data elements.
The access sequence of leaf nodes h(x1); : : : ; h(xn) is
defined as the search order from left to right with depth
first priority.
A. Notation and Preliminaries
Bilinear Map. A bilinear map is a map e : GG! GT ,
where G is a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group and GT
is another multiplicative cyclic group of prime order
p with the following properties [28], [29]: (i) Com-
putable: there exists an efficiently computable algorithm
for computing e; (ii) Bilinear: for all h1; h2 2 G and
a; b 2 Zp, e(ha1 ; hb2) = e(h1; h2)ab; (iii) Non-degenerate:
e(g; g) 6= 1, where g is a generator of G.
Merkle Hash Tree. A Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) is
a well-studied authentication structure [30], which is
intended to efficiently and securely prove that a set of
elements are undamaged and unaltered. It is constructed
as a binary tree where the leaves in the MHT are the
hashes of authentic data values. Figure 2 depicts an
example of authentication. The verifier with the authentic
hr requests for fx2; x7g and requires the authentication
of the received blocks. The prover provides the veri-
fier with the auxiliary authentication information (AAI)

2 =< h(x1); hd > and 
7 =< h(x8); he >. The veri-
fier can then verify x2 and x7 by first computing h(x2),
h(x7), hc = h(h(x1)jjh(x2)), hf = h(h(x7)jjh(x8)),
ha = h(hcjjhd), hb = h(hejjhf ) and hr = h(hajjhb),
and then checking if the calculated hr is the same as the
authentic one. MHT is commonly used to authenticate
the values of data blocks. However, in this paper we
further employ MHT to authenticate both the values and
the positions of data blocks. By the way of computing
the root in MHT, the leaf node positions can be unique
determined through the left-to-right and depth-first se-
quence.
B. Definition
In our scheme, both public verifiability and fully
dynamic data operation are supported. We now show the
definitions and parameters used in our construction.
5(pk; sk); (pk0; sk0)  Setup(1k). It takes as input
security parameter 1k, returns the key pairs of the cloud
audit and storage servers.
(F ; t; t0) Upload(sk; sk0; F ). There are two phases
in this algorithm. In the first phase, the client uploads
its data file F to the cloud audit server, where F is an
ordered collection of blocks fMig. In the second phase,
the file F is re-uploaded to the cloud storage server
by the cloud audit server: it takes as input the private
key sk and F , and outputs the signature set , which
is an ordered collection of signatures fig on fMig.
We denote the stored file F  = fF;g. It also outputs
metadata-the root R of a Merkle hash tree from fMig
and the signature t = sigsk(h(R)) as the tag of F .
Notice that the storage server generates another receipt
on h(R) for the cloud audit server with its own private
key sk0.
1=0  IntegrityVerifyfP (pk; F ; t) 
 V (pk; t)g.
This is an interactive protocol for integrity verification
of a file F  with tag t. The cloud storage server plays
the role of prover P with input the public key pk, a
stored file F and a file tag t. The cloud audit server
plays the role of verifier V with input pk and t. At the
end of the protocol, V outputs TRUE (1) if F  passes
the integrity verification, or FALSE (0) otherwise.
(F ; t) UpdatefP (pk; F^ ; t^)
 V (sk; t^; update)g.
This is an interactive protocol for dynamic update of a
file F^  with tag t^. The cloud storage server plays the
role of prover P with input the public key pk, a stored
file F^ , and a file tag t^. The cloud audit server plays
the role of verifier V with input the private key sk, t^,
and an data operation request “update” from the client.
At the end of the protocol, V outputs a file tag t of the
updated file F  if P gives a valid proof for the update,
or FALSE (0) otherwise.
Correctness. A PoR scheme is correct if the following
two conditions hold:
 If (F ; t)  Upload(sk; F ), then
IntegrityVerifyfP (pk; F ; t)
 V (pk; t)g = 1.
 If (F ; t)  UpdatefP (pk; F^ ; t^) 

V (sk; t^; update)g, then
IntegrityVerifyfP (pk; F ; t)
 V (pk; t)g = 1.
Remarks. Since the cloud audit server is fully trusted
in the two-server architecture, we allow it to generate
the key pairs on behalf of the clients in the setup phase.
However, it might be undesirable to place full trust on the
cloud audit server in some outsourcing tasks. Consider
the following scenario: one storage service is available
to the clients on a pay-per-use basis, and the audit
server may upload a file, intentionally or mistakenly, on
behalf of one client who did not ask for storing that file.
One solution for such applications is utilizing a proxy
signature scheme supporting delegation by warrant [31]–
[33] to delegate the signing right of the clients to the
cloud audit server for each usage. The warrant to the
audit server can be the hashed value of the uploaded file
as a credential of the delegation.
C. The Core Construction
Now we start to present the main idea behind our
scheme. As in the previous PoR systems [2], [3], we
assume the client encodes the raw data file eF into F
using some rate- error correcting codes, e.g. Reed-
Solomon codes. To further reduce the computation load
of the client, we can require that eF is pre-processed by
the cloud audit server. The encoded file F is divided into
n blocks M1; : : : ;Mn, and each block has s sectors,
i.e. Mi = (Mi1;Mi2;    ;Mis), where Mij 2 Zp for
i = 1; : : : ; n, j = 1; : : : ; s, and p is a large prime.
Let e : G  G ! GT be a bilinear map, with three
cryptographic hash functions H;h : f0; 1g ! G and
f : f0; 1g ! Zp, viewed as random oracles [3]. Let g
be the generator of G. The procedure of our protocol
execution is as follows:
Setup: The cloud audit server chooses a random
  Zp, u1; u2;    ; us  G, and computes v  g.
The secret key is sk =  and the public key is
pk = (v; fujg1js). The cloud storage server’s private
key is sk0 = 0 with public key v0  g0 .
Upload (Phase 1: Client! Cloud Audit Server):
The client uploads F = (M1; : : : ;Mn) to the cloud
audit server. Given the file F , the cloud audit server
generates a root R based on the construction of Merkle
Hash Tree (MHT), where the leave nodes of the tree
are an ordered set of hashes of file blocks H(Mi)
(i = 1; : : : ; n). Next, he signs the root R under his
private key  as h(R)  sigsk(R). The file tag
t = sigsk(R) is sent back to the client as a receipt.
(Phase 2: Cloud Audit Server! Cloud Storage
Server): The homomorphic authenticators together
with metadata are produced as follows: for each block
Mi = (Mi1;Mi2;    ;Mis), the cloud audit server
computes a signature i as
i  
0@H(Mi)  sY
j=1
u
Mij
j
1A : (1)
Denote the set of signatures by  = fig1in. The
cloud audit server sends F  = fF;g to the cloud
storage server. The cloud storage server generates a
receipt t0 with his own private key on root R. Then,
the audit server keeps the receipt t0 and deletes F  from
its local storage.
61. Generate a random set {(i, νi)}1≤i≤c.
Cloud Audit Server
2. Compute µj =
∑
i
νiMij and σ =
∏
i
σ
νi
i
.
Integrity proof
Cloud Storage Server
Challenge request: Q = {(i, νi)}1≤i≤c
3. Compute R from {H(Mi),Ωi}1≤i≤c.
5. Verify integrity of {Mi}1≤i≤c;
4. Verify signature of R. Output FALSE and abort if not true.
Output FALSE if not true, otherwise output TRUE.
P = {{µj}1≤j≤s, σ, {H(Mi),Ωi}1≤i≤c, sigsk(h(R))}
Fig. 3: Protocols for Integrity Verification
Integrity Verification: Either the client or the cloud
audit server can verify the integrity of the outsourced
data by challenging the cloud storage server. To generate
the challenge query, the cloud audit server (verifier) picks
a random c-element subset I of set [1; n] that denote the
positions of the blocks to be checked. For each i 2 I ,
picks a random element i  f(t; i; ), where  denotes
the time of query. Let Q be the set f(i; i)g, which
is sent to the cloud storage server. Upon receiving the
challenge query Q = f(i; i)g1ic, the cloud storage
server computes
j =
X
f(i;i)g2Q
iMij 2 Zp (2)
for j = 1; : : : ; s, and
 =
Y
f(i;i)g2Q
ii 2 G: (3)
In addition, the cloud storage server will also provide the
cloud audit server with a small amount of auxiliary in-
formation. The auxiliary values are the nodes siblings to
the nodes fH(Mi)g1ic to the root R. Let f
ig1ic
denote the auxiliary information, the the cloud stor-
age server responds the cloud audit server with proof
P = ffjg1js; ; fH(Mi);
ig1icg. Upon receiv-
ing the responses from the cloud storage server, the cloud
audit server performs the following computations: (1)
generates root R using fH(Mi);
ig1ic and checks
the consistency; (2) checks if e(t; g) = e(h(R); v). (3)
checks whether
e(; g) = e
0@ Y
f(i;i)g2Q
H(Mi)
i 
sY
j=1
u
j
j ; v
1A :(4)
If all the checking holds, output TRUE; otherwise,
output FALSE. The whole protocol procedures are
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Dynamic Update: In the following, we consider the
most general operations involved in dynamic update, that
is, data modification, data insertion and data deletion.
 Data Modification: Suppose a client intends to
modify the i-th block Mi to M 0i , then the following
procedures have to been performed:
1) The client sends an update request message
“update = (M; i;M 0i)” to the cloud audit
server, where M denotes the modification
operation.
2) Upon receiving the request, the cloud audit
server generates the corresponding signature
0i =

H(M 0i) 
Qs
j=1 u
M 0ij
j

, and sends
update0 = (update; 0i) to the storage server.
3) Upon receiving update0, the storage server
performs the following operations.
– He replaces the block Mi with M 0i and
outputs F 0.
– Replaces the i with 0i and outputs 0.
– Replaces H(Mi) with H(M 0i) in the
Merkle hash tree construction and generates
the new root R0.
– For the modification operation, replies
the client with a proof Pupdate =
(
i; H(Mi); R
0), where 
i is the AAI of
Mi.
4) After receiving the proof Pupdate from the
storage server, the cloud audit server operates
as follows.
– He generates root R using f
i;H(Mi)g.
– Authenticates R by checking if e(t; g) =
e(h(R); v).
– Computes the new root value R^ using
f
i;H(M 0i)g and checks if R^ = R0.
– Signs the new root metadata R0 by t0 =
sigsk(R
0) and sends it to the server for
storage.
 Data Insertion: Suppose the data owner wants to
insert block M after the i-th block Mi. The proto-
col procedures are similar to the data modification
case.
1) After receiving the proof for insert operation
from the storage server, the client first gener-
ates root R using f
i;H(Mi)g and authenti-
cates R by checking if e(t; g) = e(h(R); v).
2) If it is not true, output FALSE, otherwise the
client can now check whether the server has
perform the insertion as required or not, by
further computing the new root value using
f
i;H(H(Mi)kH(M))g and comparing it
with R0.
73) If not, output FALSE, otherwise output TRUE.
4) The cloud auditor server signs the new root
metadata R0 by sigsk(R0) and sends it to the
server for storage.
 Data Deletion: Data deletion is just the opposite op-
eration of data insertion. For single block deletion,
it refers to deleting the specified block and moving
all the latter blocks one block forward. Suppose the
server receives the update request of deleting block
Mi, it will delete Mi from its storage space, delete
the leaf node H(Mi) in the MHT and generate the
new root metadata R0. The details of the protocol
procedures are similar to those of data modification
and insertion, which are thus omitted here.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Security Modeling
We analyze the security of our scheme under a variant
of Shacham and Waters’ PoR model [3] which supports
public verifiability and dynamic update operations. Be-
sides, our model offers strengthened security by allowing
a malicious storage server to perform reset attack against
the client (the cloud audit server) in upload phase.
The basic goal of PoR model is to achieve proof of
retrievability. Informally, this property ensures that if an
adversary can generate valid integrity proofs of any file
F for a non-negligible fraction of challenges, we can
construct a PPT machine to extract F with overwhelming
probability. It is formally defined by the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary A, where C
plays the role of the audit server (the client) and A plays
the role of the storage server:
 Setup Phase: The challenger C runs the Setup
algorithm to generate its key pair (pk; sk), and
forwards pk to the adversary A.
 Upload Phase: C initiates an empty table called R-
list. A can adaptively query an upload oracle with
reset capability as follows:
– Upload: When a query on a file F and a
state index i comes, C checks if there is an
entry (i; ri) in the R-list. If the answer is
yes, C overwrites ri onto its random tape;
otherwise, C inserts (i; ri) into R-list where
ri is the content on its random tape. Then C
runs (F ; t)  Upload(sk; F ; ri), and returns
the stored file F  and the file tag t. Here
Upload( ; ri) denotes an execution of the up-
load algorithm using randomness ri.
 Challenge Phase: A can adaptively make the fol-
lowing two kinds of oracle queries:
– IntegrityVerify: When a query on a file tag t
comes, C runs the integrity verification protocol
IntegrityVerifyfA
 C(pk; t)g with A.
– Update: When a query on a file tag t^ and
a data operation request “update” comes,
C runs the update protocol UpdatefA 

C(sk; t^; update)g with A.
 Output Phase: A outputs a file tag t and the
description of a prover Pt.
We say that a prover Pt on t is -admissible, if the
following two conditions hold:
(1) t is a file tag output by a previous upload query.
(2) Pr[IntegrityVerifyfPt 
 C(pk; t)g = 1]  .
Then we can define the soundness of PoR scheme.
Definition 1: (Proof of Retrievability) A PoR
scheme is (; )-sound if for any -admissible prover
Pt output by A in the above game, there exists an
extractor E that can recover the original file of tag t
with probability at least 1  .
Since our model considers reset attack in upload
phase, it provides higher security for PoR schemes. To
prove this result, we show that Shacham and Waters’
PoR scheme, which is proven secure in previous PoR
model, is insecure in the new model.
Theorem 1: Shacham and Waters’ PoR scheme is not
sound in our new model.
Proof: In Shacham and Waters’ PoR scheme, the tag
t of an uploaded file F is computed as t0kSSigssk(t0).
Here t0 = nameknku1k : : : kus, where name R Zp,
n is the number of blocks in F , u1; : : : ; us
R G;
SSigssk() is the signing algorithm of a signature
scheme, where the signing key ssk is included in sk.
We construct an adversary A that wins the soundness
game with non-negligible probability as follows:
 Upload Phase: A chooses two different files of
n blocks, say F = fM1; : : : ;Mng and F^ =
fM 01; : : : ;M 0ng. Then A makes an Upload query
on (F; 1), gets (F ; t), but stores t only. Finally A
makes an Upload query on (F^ ; 1), gets and stores
(F^ ; t^) honestly.
 Output Phase: A outputs t and a prover Pt =
P (pk; F^ ; t^), where P is the prover algorithm of
an honest storage server.
A does nothing in Setup Phase and Challenge Phase, so
we skip these two phases above. Notice the following
two observations:
(1) The tag generation only depends on the random-
ness used for choosing name; u1; : : : ; us and the
number of file blocks n. The uploading queries
on (F; 1) and (F^ ; 1) use the same randomness r1
(an entry (1; r1) will be inserted into R-list after
querying (F; 1) to the upload oracle). Besides, F
and F^  both have n blocks. Therefore, we have
t^ = t.
(2) (F^ ; t^) is the honestly stored file of F^ , so Pt is a
valid proof of F^ with tag t^, i.e. IntegrityVerifyf
8P (pk; F^ ; t^)
 C(pk; t^)g = 1.
From (1) and (2), we have IntegrityVerifyfPt 

C(pk; t)g = 1 with probability  = 1, by correctness
of the scheme. That is, A outputs a 1-admissible prover
Pt on the file tag t.
Since that all the information A stores are F^  and t^
(where t = t^), only F^ can be extracted from A’s storage.
However, the original file of tag t is F 6= F^ . By the
knowledge of F^ , we can know nothing about F but that
F has n blocks. Therefore, given Pt = P (pk; F^ ; t^), it
is impossible to construct a (1; )-extractor of the file
F (even when assume that the extractor has unlimited
computing power) for any . This completes the proof.
B. Security Proofs
The security of our PoR scheme proposed in Section
3.3 assumes the hardness of the Computational Diffie-
Hellman problem.
Definition 2: (CDH Problem) The Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem is that, given g, gx; gy 2 G1
for unknown x; y 2 Zp, to compute gxy .
We say that the (t; )-CDH assumption holds in G1 if
no t-time algorithm has the non-negligible probability 
in solving the CDH problem.
Theorem 2: If the computational Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard in bilinear groups, no adversary against
the soundness of our public-verifiable PoR scheme could
cause the verifier to accept an integrity proof of any file
F with non-negligible probability in the random oracle
model, except by responding with correctly computed
values.
Proof:
The security of soundness is given by reduction.
We assume that there is an adversary who can break
the soundness. Another simulator will be constructed
by interacting with the adversary. The simulator also
answers all the queries for PoR protocol, including the
tag generation and integrity proof. After the simulation,
if the adversary outputs a valid tag without the help of
client, the simulator breaks the assumption of computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman problem. Suppose that an adver-
sary outputs the description of a prover that causes the
verifier to accept an integrity proof with non-negligible
probability, by responding with values that are not cor-
rectly computed. Let F = (M1; : : : ;Mn) be the file for
integrity verification,  = fig1in be the signatures
of file blocks, Q = f(i; i)g1ic be the verification
query. Denote the expected response from a honest
prover by P = ffjg1js; ; fH(Mi);
ig1icg, and
denote the proof generated by the adversary be P 0 =
ff0jg1js; 0; fH(M 0i);
0ig1icg where P 0 6= P .
First, we show that fH(M 0i);
0ig1ic =
fH(Mi);
ig1ic if the hash functions H and h
are collision resistent. Denote by R0 the Merkle Hash
Tree root generated from fH(M 0i);
0ig, and denote
by R the MHT root R generated from fH(Mi);
ig.
Suppose fH(M 0i);
0ig1ic 6= fH(Mi);
ig1ic,
there must be R 6= R0 except with negligible probability
due to the collision resistance of H . The signature on R0
can pass the verification, so (1) e(t; g) = e(h(R0); v).
Since t = h(R), we have (2) e(t; g) = e(h(R); v).
From (1) and (2), h(R0) = h(R), implying a collision
(R;R0) of h which occurs with negligible probability.
So the adversary outputs the correct hashes of file
blocks fH(Mi);
ig1ic in the proof P 0 except with
probability 1   (1   1=p)lgn+1, when H and h are
modeled as random oracles.
Then we show that 0 =  if the computational Diffie-
Hellman problem is hard. Otherwise, we construct a sim-
ulator, that given g; ~g = g; h 2 G where  is unknown,
outputs h. In the setup phase, the simulator sets v as ~g,
chooses two vectors of randomness 1; : : : ; s 2 Zp and
1; : : : ; s 2 Zp, and sets uj = gjhj for j = 1; : : : ; s.
It initiates three empty hash tables H-table, h-table, f -
table, and simulates the oracle queries as follows:
 H oracle: When a query of Mi comes where there
exists (Mi; ri) in the H-table for some ri, returns
ri. The h oracle and f oracle process such queries
similarly. When a query of a fresh Mi comes,
performs the following:
(1) Randomly chooses ri 2 Zp.
(2) If there exists (M 0; ri) in the H-table, go to
step (1).
(3) Inserts (Mi; ri) in the H-table and returns
H(Mi) = g
ri=(g
Ps
j=1 jMijh
Ps
j=1 jMij ).
 h oracle: when a oracle query of a fresh R comes,
performs the following:
(1) Randomly chooses r 2 Zp.
(2) If there exists (R0; r) in the h-table, go to step
(1).
(3) Inserts (R; r) in the H-table and returns
h(R) = gr.
The step (2) in the simulation of H oracle and h
oracle ensures that H , h are collision resistant, and
the reset attack by uploading different files using
the same randomness will not work.
 f oracle: when a oracle query of a fresh  comes,
performs the following:
(1) Randomly chooses  2 Zp.
(2) If there exists (; ) in the f -table, go to step
(1).
(3) Inserts (; ) in the f -table, and returns
f() = .
 Upload Oracle: when a oracle query of F =
fM1;    ;Mng and a state index i comes, sets the
random tape as the challenger does in the game
9defined in Section 4.1, and performs the following
computation:
(1) Query Mi to H oracle for i = 1;    ; n;
(2) Construct MHT root R from fMig, and query
R to h oracle;
(3) Compute  = fig1in where i =
(H(Mi) 
Qs
j=1 u
Mij
j )
 = (gri) = (g)ri =
~gri and (Mi; ri) is an entry in H-table;
(4) Compute t = h(R) = gr = ~gr where
(R; r) is an entry in h-table;
(5) Return F  = (F;) and t.
 Integrity Verify Oracle: when a oracle query of
a file tag t, starts an execution of IntegiryVerify
protocol with the adversary, and performs as an
honest verifier.
 Update Oracle: when a oracle query of a file tag t
for an operation “update” comes, the simulation
is similar to Upload oracle. For instance, when
update = (M; i;M 0i), the simulator computes
0i and produces the new file tag t
0 similarly as
answering an Upload query.
Eventually the adversary outputs 0 6= , such that:
e(0; g) = e
0@ Y
f(i;i)g2Q
H(Mi)
i 
sY
j=1
u
0j
j ; v
1A : (5)
Combining with the equation 4, we have:
e(0=; g) = e
0@ sY
j=1
u
0j j
j ; v
1A
= e
0@ sY
j=1
(gjhj )
0
j j ; v
1A : (6)
We denote j = 0j  j where at least one j 6= 0,
then above equation yields:
e(h; v)
Ps
j=1 jj = e(0 1v 
Ps
j=1 jj ; g): (7)
The simulator computes h =
(0 1v 
Ps
j=1 jj )
1Ps
j=1
jj as the solution to the
given CDH instance. Since that at least one j 6= 0
and the random values j are information theoretically
hiding, the probability that
Ps
j=1 jj = 0 is about
1=p.
Now assume that 0 =  in the proof P 0, we show that
f0jg = fjg for j = 1; : : : ; s if the discrete logarithm
problem is hard. Otherwise, we construct a simulator,
that given g; h 2 G, outputs x such that h = gx, by
acting as the verifier to play with the adversary. The
simulation for the oracle queries is similar as above
except that v = g is honestly generated in the Setup
phase, such that the simulator can produce signatures of
file blocks by itself with the knowledge of  to answer
an Upload query.
Eventually the adversary outputs f0jg for j =
1; : : : ; s, such that at least one of them is not equal to
the corresponding value in fjg. Since that e(0; g) =
e(; g), the following equation holds:
e
0@ Y
f(i;i)g2Q
H(Mi)
i 
sY
j=1
u
0j
j ; v
1A
= e
0@ Y
f(i;i)g2Q
H(Mi)
i 
sY
j=1
u
j
j ; v
1A : (8)
So we have
Qs
j=1 u
0j
j =
Qs
j=1 u
j
j , therefore:
sY
j=1
u
j
j =
sY
j=1
(gjhj )j
= g
Ps
j=1 jjh
Ps
j=1 jj = 1: (9)
The simulator computes x =  
Ps
j=1 jjPs
j=1 jj
as the
solution to the given DL instance. The simulation fails
when
Ps
j=1 jj = 0 with probability about 1=p.
In conclusion, if the proof P 0 6= P causes the verifier
to accept, we can either break the computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption, or the discrete logarithm assump-
tion, or collision resistance of the hash functions H or h.
Notice that the hardness of discrete logarithm assumption
is implied by the computational Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion, and H , h are modeled as random oracles that are
inherently collision resistant. Hence we complete the
proof for this theorem in the random oracle model based
on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Theorem 1 ensures that all the provers winning the
adversarial game are well-behaved, i.e. any valid proof
must be exactly the same as the proof computed by an
honest storage server except with a negligible probabil-
ity.
Theorem 3: For any well behaved -admissible
prover Pt on a n-block file of tag t, there exists
an extractor that can recover the original file in time
O(n2(s + 1) + (1 + n2)n=!) by running O(n=!)
interactions with Pt, where ! =  1=p (n=n c+1)c.
Following Theorem 1, we can construct an extractor to
interact with the prover Pt and get correctly computed
proofs for -fraction of the verification queries in the
query space Zp. Applying combinatorial techniques, a
-fraction of encoded file blocks are retrievable after
at most O(n=!) interactions. Then these file blocks
suffice for recovering the original file using the decoding
procedure of rate- error correcting codes. Since that our
modeling for integrity verification protocol is the same
as in Shacham and Waters’ PoR model, the simulation
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for extracting the original file is similar to that in [3], so
we omit the details of the proof here.
The following theorem is straightly forward combining
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Theorem 4: The proposed PoR scheme is (; )-
sound for any -admissible prover Pt output by A in the
soundness game, where  = 1  (1  1=p)lgn+1 + 1=p.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will provide a thorough experi-
mental evaluation of the construction proposed. We build
our testbed by using 64-bit M2 high-memory quadruple
extra large Linux servers in Amazon EC2 platform as the
auditing server and storage server, and a Linux machine
with Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU clocked at 2.40 GHz
and 2 GB of system memory as the user.
In order to achieve  = 80 bit security, the prime order
p of the GDH group G of the bilinear mapping should
be 160 bits in length. Note that in all the evaluations,
the groups G and GT are selected in 160-bit and 512-
bit length respectively. Suppose there is a 4 GB file with
block size 4 KB, then it has n = 1000000 blocks and
s = 25 sectors each block. When it is uploaded onto the
storage server, the set of signatures on the file blocks
only requires for an additional storage of 20 MB for
data integrity verification.
For the integrity verification protocol, the query Q =
f(i; i)g1ic is c(lgn + 2) bits long. However, in
the random oracle model, we can use a seed of 2
bits to replace the c-element query, and the storage
server can use the hash oracle to generate the full
query after receiving the seed from the client. When
 = 80, the query length is only 20 bytes. The
response P = ffjg1js; ; fH(Mi);
ig1icg is
2(clgn+c+s+1) bits long (34 KB for the 4 GB file).
We can see that the communication cost grows almost
linearly as the block size increases, this is mainly caused
by the increasing in size of the verification block. In the
protocol of dynamic data operation, the request update0
from the audit server is 2(s+ 1) + lgn bits (540 bytes
for the 4 GB file), and the response from the storage
server is Pupdate = 2(lgn+2) bits long (440 bytes for
the 4 GB file).
Moreover, we evaluate the communication cost for
each user’s communication cost in Amazon EC2 cloud
environment, which is 92 ms. Note that such an over-
head includes the time consuming for transmission and
authentication at Amazon EC2 cloud platform.
In our experiment, we use  to denote the vari-
ous erasure code rate while maintaining high detection
probability of file corruption. In our schemes, rate 
denotes that any -fraction of the blocks suffices for file
recovery. According to [1], if t fraction of the file is
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corrupted, by asking proof for a constant c blocks of the
file, the verifier can detect this server misbehavior with
probability 1  (1  t)c. When t is set to be 1  , the
probability could be (1  )c. Similar to [1], 460 blocks
are enough for the integrity verification algorithm.
In the first experiment, the computational overhead
for the tag generation of files at the cloud audit server
is evaluated. We have not checked the computational
overhead at users because it only needs the computation
of a digital signature, which is very small compared with
the computation of the tags. The reason is that the most
overhead computation has been delivered to the cloud
audit server. Three different numbers of s are chosen
in the experiment to show the effect on the efficiency
of the time cost. From Fig. 4, we can see that the time
cost grows when the number of s decreases. The average
time cost for file with size 50KB is 5s. Compared with
the previous related work [12], [25], the computational
overhead at users in [12], [25] is outsourced to the cloud
audit server.
The response time at the user side including the time
cost of uploading files, tag generation at the audit server,
construction of Merkle-hash tree, the communication
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cost and signature generation. To evaluate the response
time, the cost of uploading file to the cloud audit server
is tested. For file with 10MB, the average time cost
is 25s. The time cost of construction for the Merkle-
hash tree is 27s for the file with size 10MB. The
signature generation for the root is 3ms, which can be
omitted compared with the time cost of uploading and
construction of Merkle-hash tree. Note that the time cost
of uploading files cannot be avoided in any applications.
Though the tag generation cost is also close to the time
cost of uploading files, the cloud audit server can process
these tag generation during the file uploading. Thus, the
additional time for the response is very small. This is
acceptable for the users because the time cost would be
double at the user side if the tag is computed by the
users.
We further evaluate the performance for verification
at both cloud audit server and cloud storage server in a
scalable system in Fig. 5. Obviously, as the growth of the
number of s in system, the time cost for response value
at cloud storage server is increasing. This is because it
needs to compute all the exponentiations for each block
in a tag. Whereas, such cost at cloud audit server is
almost constant (nearly 650 ms) because 460 blocks are
enough for the integrity verification no matter what is
the size of file to be checked.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes OPoR, a new proof of retrievabil-
ity for cloud storage, in which a trustworthy audit server
is introduced to preprocess and upload the data on behalf
of the clients. In OPoR, the computation overhead for
tag generation on the client side is reduced significantly.
The cloud audit server also performs the data integrity
verification or updating the outsourced data upon the
clients’ request. Besides, we construct another new PoR
scheme proven secure under a PoR model with enhanced
security against reset attack in the upload phase. The
scheme also supports public verifiability and dynamic
data operation simultaneously.
There are several interesting topics to do along this
research line. For instance, we can (1) reduce the trust
on the cloud audit server for more generic applications,
(2) strengthen the security model against reset attacks
in the data integrity verification protocol, and (3) find
more efficient constructions requiring for less storage
and communication cost. We leave the study of these
problems as our future work.
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